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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD E. LISH, JR.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No.

14111

vs.
DEAN COMPTON,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a grain broker, filed this action
against the defendant, a farmer, for damages for
breach of contract alleging a verbal contract for
the purchase of 15,000 bushels of wheat was entered
into by the parties on August 3, 1973, and that a
confirmation signed by plaintiff was mailed to
defendant on August 14 and received August 15, and
no written notice of objection was mailed by defendant

-2to plaintiff within ten days thereafter.
".••'.'.• DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court submitted special interrogatories
to the jury and granted judgment to the plaintiff for
$13,150,00 damages against the defendant.
•

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUCKT ON APPEAL
Defendant appeals for a determination that the

purported contract did not exist, was unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, the defendant being a
farmer and not a merchant, and the purported confirmation
having not been mailed within a reasonable time, actual
notice of rejection having been received and admitted
in open court by the plaintiff, and in any event the
computation of damages was erroneous.
"

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant for 25 years, either alone or with his
father, has been a hay and grain farmer, (Tr« 100).
He has never sold these commodities .for anyone other
than himself nor any that wasn't produced on his farm,
(Tr. 126). The plaintiff had previously, both hauled
and bought defendantfs grain, (Tr.

128-131).

The facts

-3are that on August 2, 1973, one or more telephone
conversations between the parties occurred regarding
the price of defendant's rye infested red wheat crop
at his Sublet, Idaho Farm.

Plaintiff's version of the

telephone conversation appearing at (Tr. 18-18-31)
and the defendant's version appearing at (Tr. 132-133)
and both versions indicating that defendant would let
his wheat go if he could get $3.30 or $3.31 per bushel
and plaintiff stating that he would see if he could
get that price.

Thereafter plaintiff contacted

Pillsbury and received a confirmation of sale to
them (Tr. 19-4).

No further contact or communication

between the parties occurred until August 15, 1973,
when defendant phoned plaintiff to see if plaintiff
would haul defendant's wheat and plaintiff indicated
(Tr. 29-17-24) he knew what the problem would be and
told him among other things "you don't have any wheat,
I've sold it

-

didn't you get my confirmation

- ".

The confirmation, Exhibit 2, was dated August 3,
but appeared in plaintiff's pad of confirmations as
No. 21 and followed Nos. 19 and 20, both dated August
13, Nos. 16, 17, and 18, all dated August 8 and No. 15
dated August 4, and was followed by Nos. 22 and 23
dated August 14.

(Tr. 68)

(Def's Ex. #11)

-4On August 2, 1973 plaintiff claims to have
sold the same 15,000 bushels of Tas is1 wheat to
Pillsbury at $3.45 per bushel, but in fact is filling
this Pillsbury contract with other wheat (Tr. 82-29)
and (Exhibit 10) beginning on August 9th, six days
before receiving notice of objection to his claimed
contract with defendant.

The market price of No. 1

red wheat on August 2 (Tr. 63-14) and on August 3,
(Exhibit No. 4) at Ogden, Utah, was $3.63 per bushel,
an apparent difference in fas is1 wheat and No. 1 red
wheat of 18<f: per bushel.

There was no other direct

evidence of the difference in Tas isT and No. 1 red
wheat market price introduced at the trial, although
in addition to the apparent indication of 18<j: difference
on August 3, plaintiff in his testimony (Tr. Ill-lines
14-20) applied a 19£ per bushel difference in September
1973.

The price of No. 1 red wheat fluctuated sharply

and rose by as much as 90^ per bushel by August 8, 1973,
(Tr. 79-32) yet no confirmation or other notice was
mailed by the broker to the farmer until August 14,
even though plaintiff by his own admission knew there
would" be trouble and almost the first thing asked by
him on the 15th was whether or not the confirmation
had been received.

-5ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER OR NOT A CONTRACT EXISTED TO THE

•

JURY.
It would seem clear the court should not
have sumitted to the jury the question of whether
or not a contract was entered into between the
parties when the facts show that the plaintiff's
allegation of the date of the contract, was August
3, by Exhibit 2 purporting to confirm a contract
"of this dayn on August 3, and no contact or
communication occured between the parties on
August 3.

Further, it appears (Tr. 82-29) that

plaintiff was buying wheat as early as August 9
and had applied at least three loads to the Pillsbury
contract prior to the time he mailed his purported
confirmation to the defendant or received notice
of the rejection of such confirmation (See Also,
Exhibit 10).
The section of the statute relied on by plaintiff
is found in 70A-2-201:
(2) "Between merchants if within a reasonable
time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know
its contents, it satisfies the requirements of

-6subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received.fl
This statute indicates that the writing must be in confirmation of a prior contract. Such contract would have had
to have been completed on August 2, not August 3.
Obviously neither plaintiff nor defendant treated the
events of August 2, as completing a contract, the
plaintiff waiting until he had sold 15,000 bushels of
f

as isT red wheat and having received a confirmation

thereof and having begun filling that contract with
other purchases.

Plaintiff was well aware of the

necessity for giving notice of the purported sale to the
defendant as evidenced by his own testimony (Tr. 29-17 to
24) he asked if defendant had received confirmation, and
knowing that the defendant was going to tell him he
wouldn't follow through.
• POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER THE PURPORTED WRITING (CONFIRMATION) WAS
RECEIVED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
Whether plaintiff backdated to August 3, the purported
confirmation No. 21, Exhibit No. 2 on the 14th of August
as it would appear from the other confirmations.which he
was making on a more or less regular basis from August
2, to August 15, or whether he simply held the confirmation until the 14th of August is unknown*

However, in

;

l;

-7light of the fact that plaintiff was well aware of the
rapidly flutuating market, was regularly preparing confirmations of other sales, it would seem on its face so
clear as to not require argument, that plaintiff delayed
an unreasonable length of time in forwarding the confirmation.
"Reasonable Time" means as soon as circumstances
will permit.

Lund vs. St. Paul M. § M. R. Co. 71 Pac

1032 31 Wash 286.
Generally "Reasonable Time" is a question of law;
Alsam Holding Company vs. Consolidated Tax Payers Mutual
Insurance Company,,N.Y.S. 2nd 498.
"Reasonable Time" means so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances.

State vs. Commissioners of

Cascade County 296 Pac 1 89 Montana 37.

••-./

"Reasonable Time" may be defined generally to be so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for
a reasonable, prudent and diligent man to do conveniently
what the contract or duty requires should be done, having
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any,
to the other party to be affected.

Citizens Bank Bldg.

vs. Ellen E. Wertheimer 180 SW 361 126 Arkansan 38.
Similar language used in Minnesota, Kentucky Cases.
"Reasonable Time" if facts are clearly established
or are undisputed, is a question of law.
16 Main 164.

Hill vs. Hobart

"Reasonable Time" is so much time as is

necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently

-8what the contract or duty requires should be done in
a particular case. A "Reasonable Time" when no time
is specified is a question of law and depends on the
subject matter and the situation of the parties*

Cole-

fax County vs. Butler County 120 NW 444 83 Nebraska 803.
POINT III.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT WAS A 'MERCHANT1.
The court committed error in submitting to the jury
the question of whether or not defendant was a fmerchant1.
The record is clear that defendant was a farmer only,
with the exception of a short period of time when he
hired out as a mechanic.

Defendant never sold or bought

wheat for anyone other than himself and other than the
sale of his own wheat has never dealt in grain, or
otherwise by his occupation held himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the grain trade nor has
he employed an agent of broker or intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.

Defendant should have been allowed to answer

these questions even though without his answering such
questions there is no evidence whatever in the record
which would justify finding this defendant to be a
merchant.

We believe the case of Cook Grains Inc. vs.

Paul Fallis, an Arkansas Case, 395 S.W. 2nd 555, 239

-9Ark 962, wherein the court pointed out that a farmer
farming 550 acres of soybean land,
"if the general assembly had intended that in
the circumstances of this case a farmer should
be considered a merchant and therefore liable
on an alleged contract to sell his commodities,
which he did not sign, no doubt clear and explicit
language would have been used in the statute to
that effect. There is nothing whatever in the
statute indicating that the word 'merchant1
should apply to a farmer when he is acting in the
capacity of a farmer, and he comes within that
*
category when he is merely trying to sell the
commodities he has raised"
correctly states the law as it should be applied in Utah,
and in the instant case.
POINT IV.

•

r.

THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED AN ORAL
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF WHEAT.

>

y

t

.-• t.

4,

Both the pleadings and all of defendant's testimony
in court denied the existence of a contract between the
parties and there was no evidence before the jury that
the defendant admitted in his pleadings, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract was made.

The court

erroneously allowed in over objection testimony of what
could have been no more than a compromise offer or gift
to the prejudice of the defendant.

But even having

allowed that testimony in, it was not an acknowledgment ,
in court of the existence of a contract.

The court

-10itself should have decided the question as a matter of
law, and the submission to the jury of the question was
prejudicial to defendant.
POINT V.
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF REJECTION WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY
PLAINTIFF'S SENDER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED BY THE
COURT AS SUFFICIENT WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN
NOTICE OF REJECTION.
The notice of rejection which plaintiff acknowledged
in open court to have received August 15th verbally from
the defendant should have been as a matter of law treated
as sufficient notice of rejection without requiring
written notice.

There seems no valid reason why verbal

rejection acknowledged in open court to have been received
should be given less affect than would be given an
acknowledgment in court of the existence of a verbal
contract.
POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES.
Even though plaintiff plead damages of $23,850.00
and sdme testimony of purchases by plaintiff after August
15th was erroneously admitted in evidence to the prejudice
of defendant, it is clear from the record and from the
arguments of counsel and from the statute that the most

-11that plaintiff could be entitled to as damages would be
the difference in price of 'as is' wheat on the 3rd day
of August as compared to the 15th day of August when
plaintiff was advised that he would get no wheat under
his claimed contract.

Plaintiff's exhibits and testimony

all point to the fact that No. 1 red wheat on August 2nd
and 3rd was $3.63 per bushel at Ogden and the price on
August 15th was $4.37 per bushel.

Thus the maximum

damages that could have been suffered by plaintiff was
74$ per bushel.

Since plaintiff did not haul defendant's

wheat from Sublet, Idaho to Ogden, Utah, the court's
use of the $3.30 figure was obviously error, and the
court's submission to the jury of the question of the
market value of 'as is' wheat was error under the circumstances
The jury's finding of $4.25 market value of 'as is' wheat
on August 15th cannot be reconciled with the evidence
and particularly with Exhibit 4 and 5 or the other testimony relating to the Ogden Market price of No. 1 red
wheat.
Further the evidence clearly shows and is undisputed
(Tr. 18-16 to 22) wherein plaintiff testified that the
only wheat under consideration was what wheat the defendand was in the process of harvesting or was about to
harvest on his Sublet, Idaho farm.

This figure produced

-12was in fact 12,000 bushels,

(Tr. 137-31)

Damages there-

fore could not exceed 74^ times 12,000 bushels or $8,880.00.
However, defendant was entitled to two credits thereon
even by the acknowledgment of the plaintiff's testimony
that he was authorized to apply 983 bushels in September
at $3.30 per bushel, Ogden, to the alleged contract*
Further the plaintiff was saved the 15£ per bushel freight
or trucking expense from Sublet, Idaho to Ogden, Utah.
So that as to those 983 bushels, plaintiff did not suffer
the 74<f per bushel loss ($727.42) and in fact saved-15£
per bushel freight ($147.45) expense for a total of $874.87
that should have been deducted ($8,880.00 minus $874.87)
thus $8,005.13 would be the maximum damages possibly
suffered by plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
If any significance is to be given the words Tmerchant'
and 'reasonable time' as used in the statute, then this
seems a compelling case to determine that a full time
farmer whose only brush with brokers or merchants comes
when he sells his own produce once a year, is a 'farmer'
rather than a 'merchant'.

Likewise to permit a broker

engaged full time in buying and selling grains, to delay
12 or 13 days while he makes purchases and sales and

-13confirmations at rapidly increasing prices, to reap
the benefit of his unexplained and unnecessary delay
shocks the conscience.

Such result should be avoided

either by determination that the delay was unreasonable,
or that having acknowledged in open court receipt of
notice of rejection of the purported confirmation not
yet delivered, such actual notice should be deemed at
least equivalent to the ten day written notice which would
have protected even a 'merchant1.
Respectfully submitted,

Omer J. Call
Attorney at Law
26 First Security Bank Bldg.
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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